Research Project Update: Atlas.ti Software!

In case you have not checked out my funding site, I wanted to share an update regarding the progress I have made on my field paper/dissertation project. Thanks to generous donations, I was able to purchase, download, and start working with Atlas.ti.v7 qualitative software. Below is the update posted on my funding site:

Thanks to the generous donations I've received so far, I was able to purchase and download Atlas.ti.v7 qualitative analysis software! For a "qualie" (term of endearment for someone who specializes in the use of qualitative empirical research methods), the Atlas.ti software is a dream come true. It was not long ago that researchers interested in mix-methods or grounded theory (see Kathy Charmaz (2006) for an overview of grounded theory) had to do all of this data entry and coding by hand. My first qualitative project, a narrative analysis of intimate partner violence survivors, was all by hand and I only used seven interviews. I cannot imagine what a monster this project would be if it were not for the comprehensive and easy-to-use Atlas.ti software. Of course, Atlas.ti is not the only qualitative analysis software on the market. There are certainly die-hard InVivo and NUD*IST users out there. I've tried all three software choices and find that, for a mixed-methods researcher, Atlas.ti is the most user-friendly. One of the aspects of this software that I am thrilled about with regards to my upcoming fieldwork is the ability to effortlessly upload survey responses into the program and code for themes among the quantitative, as well as qualitative data. The program allows me to combine all of my data sources into one aggregate analysis, if I so choose. What usually happens is that researchers present a qualitative and quantitative analysis together, but separately, in a paper. With Atlas.ti, I have the ability to combine them to produce what (I hope) will be a much more meaningful and in-depth understanding of why and how ex-combatants choose to defect from reintegration programs in the post-conflict period.

Thank you again to everyone who has supported me on this journey! I will continue to post updates and share exciting milestones along the way!

Cheers,

Jennifer

Rebels Propose Elections, Power-Sharing Government in CAR

Source: www.guardian.co.uk

A new development in the situation in CAR: The leaders of Seleka, the rebel coalition that has taken over the central government, have claimed that they intend to hold elections in the next three years. According to an AP article published March 25 2013, "rebel coalition chief Michel Djotodia on Monday said he would name a power-sharing government in an effort to defuse international condemnation of the coup" (AllAfrica.com). It is not yet known which parties (government, non-state, rebel group) will be given a seat in this power-sharing government. It would seem as though Seleka is attempting to usurp traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, as well as other transitional justice mechanisms often associated with violent political transition. Keep on eye on this story for the reaction of the international community, including state governments and international organizations.

Insurgency in the Central African Republic: New Questions and Familiar Cases

On March 24th, 2013, rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) orchestrated a successful coup to overthrow  President Francois Bozize. The rebels now control the capital, Bangui, and President Bozize is rumored to have fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December of 2012, these same rebel groups attempted a coup that eventually ended in a peace deal in January of 2013. The situation in CAR is of concern to those who study the behavior of rebel groups and rebel politics of Central African countries for several reasons:

1) The coalition of rebel groups in CAR has an identity of its own known as Seleka. Unlike rebel groups in Eastern DRC, for instance, the coalition that exists in CAR is highly centralized and effective. It is unclear from available reports the extent to which the individual armed groups that comprise Seleka maintain their own identities. However, we can assume that, at some point, these groups calculated that the costs of coordinating were less than those associated with pursuing individual missions for territorial control. Even the Mai-Mai of DRC are of a different typology than Seleka. The Mai-Mai possess several chapters throughout Eastern DRC, but they do not necessarily share the same political goals, nor are they centralized. 

Source: http://monitor.icef.com

2) The geopolitical location of the CAR is strategic in several ways. The CAR border South Sudan, DRC, Sudan, and Chad. Each of these countries is dealing with some sort of internal and transnational non-state violent group. What occurs in the CAR may promote conflict resolution in the area, or it may exacerbate the already volatile situation in the above-mentioned countries. In addition, a ripple effect (either positive or negative) may occur in those countries that are in close proximity, but not necessarily bordering CAR. 

3) CAR is a former French colony. Recently, with the Al Qaeda-inspired violence in Mali, French peacemaking and peacebuilding forces have been engaged on several fronts. Additionally, the French have been involved to some extent in the ongoing conflict in DRC. CAR, DRC, Cameroon, and Rwanda (among others) are all former French colonies. With the ongoing and recent conflicts in these countries, the question regarding the extent to which former colonizers are obligated to intervene becomes important. A related question is, if former colonizers were not obligated (legally, morally, or otherwise) to intervene in these conflicts, who would send troops for such an intervention? Is there an empirical reason why former colonizers are sent to quell conflict in former colonies, or is this a misguided moral obligation? These are questions that should be considered with regard to whether or not these interventions are wholly or in part successful.

While scholars have been addressing the above questions in some fashion or form for several years, this recent episode in the CAR brings to light the urgency with which we should be seeking the answers. At the moment, the central leadership of most of the countries in Central Africa is either deposed, compromised, or under pressure to reform their country's government. Stability is rare and often appears far out of reach. How, then, can regional politics and peacekeeping (supported, perhaps, by former colonial relationships), quell the ongoing and episodic conflicts that are occurring in Central Africa? The answer may provide insight into the utility of organizational theory as it applies to internal conflict management and resolution.


allAfrica.com: Central African Republic: After Rebels Overthrow President, UN Condemns Central African Republic Fighting

Preparing for Fieldwork in Central Africa

We are still waiting for news out of Kenya regarding the next President, but several sources are reporting that Kenyatta is showing a sustained and early lead against Odinga (Check in with AllAfrica.com for updates from several local news sources). As soon as we know something decisive,  I'll post a summary and reaction on this blog.

For now, I would like to share an opportunity for you to support the work that is being done to alleviate conflict and sustain peace in Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, South Sudan, and other areas where armed groups are engaged in politically-motivated and sustained violent activity.

I am finally at the stage in my current research endeavor where I can begin to collect data in the field. This summer, I will be traveling to Uganda to talk with individuals who are in some way involved in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process in the Great Lakes Region. I had originally hoped to travel to Eastern DRC, but I have been selected to attend the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research in Syracuse for two weeks in the middle of the summer. This alters my time-frame such that a trip to DRC needs to wait until I can dedicate several uninterrupted months to this endeavor. A trip to Uganda will allow me to 1) establish a network of contacts on the ground in the area (and re-connect with previous contacts), 2) find out more about the DDR situation in both Western Uganda and Eastern DRC, and 3) begin to develop an original dataset that will be used to answer questions regarding ex-combatants and the reintegration process during times of conflict as well as peace. All of this work will better prepare me to conduct fieldwork in Eastern DRC at a future date.

I encourage you to visit my fundraising site to read an abstract of the project proposal, as well as other details regarding my trip. If you feel compelled to support this project, you may make a monetary donation of your choosing on the site. I will be sure to keep all donors up-to-date regarding the progress of the project. I will also include the names of donors (unless you wish to remain anonymous) in the acknowledgements section of any publication that is produced as a result of this project. I thank you in advance for any support you are willing to give. As always, feel free to contact me regarding any questions, comments, or critiques.

IRIN News Video Series Regarding Today's Elections in Kenya

For a short introduction into the key issues and themes surrounding today's election in Kenya, please watch this video by IRIN News. You can view their entire report on the situation here: No Ordinary Elections.

Reparations in the Midst of Violence: Impractical Solution or Opportunity for Peace?

Recent goings-on in Ituri (Democratic Republic of Congo) have brought to light an issue at the forefront of the study of transitional justice. Reparation, or the compensation of victims of human rights abuses, war crimes, and mass atrocities, is a key component of the process by which a community or state deals with the past in order to pave the way for a peaceful future. Reparations are not meant to erase the past, nor are they meant to assuage victims and their families in the name of "moving on." But reparations must be addressed and disseminated in a timely and appropriate manner by the responsible parties to the entitled victims. The process by which reparations are awarded is lengthy and arduous. It can also be dangerous given that both victims and perpetrators are often brought to the witness stand to get at the truth of what has happened and the extent to which victims are entitled reparations and perpetrators are guilty.

Read the short report by the ICTJ on reparations for crimes committed by Congolese state military members:
International Center for Transitional Justice: Reparations in the DRC

In the DRC, particularly in the North Kivu provence, trials of rebel leaders, state military officers, and other perpetrators are ongoing, even as the conflict in the region rages on. One might wonder whether it is practical and cost-effective to hold trials and truth commissions in the midst of a conflict that is ongoing. I argue that, while the logistics of holding such trials and, as is mentioned in the article, the feasibility of enforcing the outcomes of trials, are difficult to achieve, the visible presence of justice in an area struggling to reach peaceful settlements is paramount to the overall transition period between conflict and peace. The importance of enforcing the reparations policies in the DRC is not only material (and the material aspect cannot be over-emphasized), but also immaterial. Follow-through on the part of the national government to recognize victims and secure for them the care and dignity to which they are entitled, sends a strong message to the entire country that the government acts in pursuit of justice, rather than pursuit of supporting the "winning side," regardless of whether or not that "winning side" belongs to rebels, warlords, and/or rogue members of the Congolese state military. Reparations then become symbolic as well as material, practical for the recovery of victims, as well as ideologically important for those communities that remain the last bastions of non- or anti-rebel territory. In this particular case, they also send a strong message to Congolese citizens that the Congolese national military is not immune to the law and will be held accountable for the crimes its members commit.

Cessation of Child Recruitment: A public health approach to a political and social problem

My experience as a public health professional has provided perspective and insight into my career as a political scientist in several ways. One way in which my cross-disciplinary training has been useful is in regard to the study of child soldiering. Specifically, my research is interested in the ways in which child soldiering (that is, the forced and/or coerced recruitment of children under the age of 16) can be prevented. Many public health and political projects that deal with the issue of child soldiering examine the causes and outcomes of the practice, but they do not explore the possibility of prevention. I argue that prevention of child soldiering is not only possible, but is a key component in the cessation of mass atrocity and crimes against humanity within the context of irregular warfare. The following is a very brief outline of this argument, including the theoretical groundings upon which the argument is based.

Preventing Prevalence of PTSD Among Children in Conflict Settings:

A Social Cognitive Theory Approach to Targeting Armed Forces as a Means to

Ceasing Forced Recruitment of Children in the Great Lakes Region

Health Issue, Behavior and Priority Group

The prevalence of malignant forms of PTSD in former child soldiers on the African continent threatens to hamper efforts for post-conflict community reconstruction.  The only way to effectively decrease the number of children diagnosed with malignant PTSD is to cease the forced recruitment of children from within refugee camps, particularly in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  The priority group for intervention implementation is composed of those individuals who are forcefully recruiting children into the armed forces within the Great Lakes Region refugee camps.

Summary of the Literature on Determinants of Forced Recruitment by Armed Forces

According to several studies, the way in which recruiting soldiers view their own environment and situation, in addition to that of the children they are charged with recruiting, may influence their behavior.  Four studies cited external factors in the recruiters’ environments, such as their military comrades and political affiliation as constructs directly affecting their recruiting behavior, (Maxted, 2003; Andvig and Gates, 2006; Singer, 2006; Lischer, 2006).  In addition, four studies also mentioned the situation, or perceived social status within ranks and perceived importance to their community, may be able to be influenced in such a way that soldiers no longer feel the pressure from environmental factors to recruit children, (Maxted, 2003; Aning and McIntyre, 2005; Singer, 2006; Beber and Blattman, 2008).  Soldiers are often told that the only way to bring order to their people is to control those who presumably do not have the capacity to thrive independently, (Aning and McIntyre, 2005).  Soldiers are conditioned to believe that if they recruit children who would otherwise be a menace to society, their country will benefit.  This conditioning builds outcome expectations among recruiting soldiers as to what will happen if they choose to recruit children into the armed forces, (Aning and McIntyre, 2005; Blattman, 2007).  Governments equate the benefit of the country as a whole with the benefit of those who assisted in its protection and support, thereby creating positive outcome expectancies for those who choose to forcefully recruit children into the armed forces, (Aning and McIntyre, 2005). 

Rationale for Social Cognitive Theory and Analysis of Determinants

            The most pervasive constructs in discussion regarding change in recruitment behavior come from the Social Cognitive Theory.  Due to the interpersonal nature of military culture, as well as the profound impact of state activities on the activities of the military, the Social Cognitive Theory is the best model by which to formulate an intervention program targeting soldiers who recruit children for service.  Utilizing the Principle of Reciprocal Determinism, it is hypothesized that by affecting environmental influences, such as implementing and enforcing the international laws and rules of warfare in areas where formal conflict exists, and by altering soldiers’ situation and outcome expectations (thereby affecting their outcome expectancies), military units will cease forceful recruit of children from refugee camps in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  One recommendation for further research would be to understand the role that self-efficacy plays in individual soldiers’ intention to cease recruitment children from refugee camps.  As self-efficacy is the single most important construct of the Social Cognitive Theory, it is imperative that program developers understand how best to improve soldiers’ confidence in choosing not to recruit children.  Lack of volitional control, however, will continue to be the greatest barrier in tackling cessation of child recruitment.  

Copyright 2013 Jennifer M Kerner, M.P.H.

Please contact the author before reproducing this publication in whole or in part: jmkerner@unm.edu

Andvig, J.C. and Gates, S.  (2006).  “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict.”  Keynote address at the Dutch Flemish Association for Economy and Peace.

Aning, K. and McIntyre, A.  (2005).  “From Youth Rebellion to Child Abduction: The Anatomy of Recruitment in Sierre Leone.”  In Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

*Beber, B. and Blattman, C.  (2008).  “Rebels without a Cause: The Use of Coercion and Children in Guerrilla Warfare.”  Lecture printed by Columbia University Press.

*Blattman, C.  (2007).  “The Causes of Child Soldiering: Theory and Evidence from Northern Uganda.”  Lecture printed by University of California Press.

*Lischer, S.K.  (2006).  “War, Displacement, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers.”  Lecture printed by Wake Forest University Press.

Maxted, J.  (2003).  “Children and Armed Conflict in Africa.”  Social Identities, 9(1):51-72.

Singer, P.W.  (2006).  “The Enablers of War: Casual Factors behind the Child Soldier Phenomenon.”  The Brookings Institute.

*Transcripts of lectures were provided following personal request.  Copies of these papers are immediately available upon request.