Showing posts with label CAR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CAR. Show all posts

Thursday, May 16, 2013

Research Updates, Travel Plans, and News Out of Africa

With the successful end of another semester, I have been preparing for a summer full of research and writing opportunities. The first half of the summer will be spent developing the research design for my dissertation which will then be workshopped at the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research (IQMR) towards the middle and end of June. I am also the manager for Dr. Christian Davenport (University of Michigan) and Dr. Kathy Powers (University of New Mexico) for a project that considers the myriad ways in which reparations are indicated, implemented, and disseminated among different populations and under varying conditions. Additionally, Ms. Brittany Ortiz, M.A. (University of New Mexico) and I are conducting a pilot study this summer for a larger project that considers questions related to memorials, collective memory, transitional justice, and mass atrocity. The pilot study this summer will be one of several studies and projects that will be carried out during my time in Uganda (a seven-week journey that will include stays in Gulu and Kitgum, among other areas in the West and North). Mr. Lars B. Parkin (Scouler & Company) will be joining me on my travels to and within Uganda as companion and assistant. Together, we plan to collect valuable data to be compiled into a brand new dataset, gather information to develop/complete several research projects, explore opportunities for future research endeavors, and blog about our experiences along the way. I will also be offering to hold brief informational question/answer Skype sessions with classes and groups while we are in Uganda. (Please contact me directly if you are interested in taking advantage of this opportunity - jennikerner@gmail.com).

Source: University of Florida
Meanwhile, the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) is deteriorating (UN Calls for Sanctions Against Seleka). Seleka, after its successful overthrow of the federal government, has been accused of committing human rights violations and acts of violent aggression against innocent populations. These acts are apparently retribution or vengeance for past wrongs. With South Sudan still developing after its independence in July 2011 (South Sudan and the Issue of Decentralization), as well as the volatile situations in both Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Northwestern Uganda, it remains to be seen whether and how Seleka will be stopped from committing these human rights violations. Another concern is, if they are successfully halted in their criminal activities, how will they be brought to justice? These situations bring to mind the complex interweb of national, subnational, and international organizations that may or may not be able to press charges against collectives of individuals with formal political affiliation who, not only control a country's government, but also play the role of adversary to many of that same country's citizens.

In an editorial published in the Kampala Observer (Ugandan Journalism and the Right to Know), the issue of "the right to know" has been highlighted in regards to recent accusations that journalists were not fairly portraying information about Tinyefuza (General David Sejusa) who has been accused of committing human rights violations and meddling in government affairs. While this situation may seem relatively unimportant given the security concerns present in the rest of the country, the concern about dissemination of information relates to Uganda's ability to process past atrocities and deal with present ones. If Uganda is not willing to deal with information and transparency in a direct and open manner, it is unlikely that transitional justice mechanisms meant to hold perpetrators accountable and provide appropriate justice to victims will be successful.

In the East, Liberia has official begun its peace and reconciliation process (Liberia: Peace and Reconciliation). It will be interesting to see how this process plays out so many years after the conflict has ended and perpetrators have been tried for crimes. This process also brings up questions regarding the temporal and spatial factors associated with developing and implementing transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions, reparations, lustration, and memorials.

I will continue to update this blog regarding activities occurring in Central Africa, and with issues related to my research. However, if you are interested in updates related to NGOs, recent news, and research opportunities related to my work, please follow my Facebook page (Jennifer M. Kerner - FB Page).


Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Rebels Propose Elections, Power-Sharing Government in CAR

Source: www.guardian.co.uk
A new development in the situation in CAR: The leaders of Seleka, the rebel coalition that has taken over the central government, have claimed that they intend to hold elections in the next three years. According to an AP article published March 25 2013, "rebel coalition chief Michel Djotodia on Monday said he would name a power-sharing government in an effort to defuse international condemnation of the coup" (AllAfrica.com). It is not yet known which parties (government, non-state, rebel group) will be given a seat in this power-sharing government. It would seem as though Seleka is attempting to usurp traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, as well as other transitional justice mechanisms often associated with violent political transition. Keep on eye on this story for the reaction of the international community, including state governments and international organizations.


Monday, March 25, 2013

Insurgency in the Central African Republic: New Questions and Familiar Cases

On March 24th, 2013, rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) orchestrated a successful coup to overthrow  President Francois Bozize. The rebels now control the capital, Bangui, and President Bozize is rumored to have fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December of 2012, these same rebel groups attempted a coup that eventually ended in a peace deal in January of 2013. The situation in CAR is of concern to those who study the behavior of rebel groups and rebel politics of Central African countries for several reasons:

1) The coalition of rebel groups in CAR has an identity of its own known as Seleka. Unlike rebel groups in Eastern DRC, for instance, the coalition that exists in CAR is highly centralized and effective. It is unclear from available reports the extent to which the individual armed groups that comprise Seleka maintain their own identities. However, we can assume that, at some point, these groups calculated that the costs of coordinating were less than those associated with pursuing individual missions for territorial control. Even the Mai-Mai of DRC are of a different typology than Seleka. The Mai-Mai possess several chapters throughout Eastern DRC, but they do not necessarily share the same political goals, nor are they centralized. 

Source: http://monitor.icef.com


2) The geopolitical location of the CAR is strategic in several ways. The CAR border South Sudan, DRC, Sudan, and Chad. Each of these countries is dealing with some sort of internal and transnational non-state violent group. What occurs in the CAR may promote conflict resolution in the area, or it may exacerbate the already volatile situation in the above-mentioned countries. In addition, a ripple effect (either positive or negative) may occur in those countries that are in close proximity, but not necessarily bordering CAR. 

3) CAR is a former French colony. Recently, with the Al Qaeda-inspired violence in Mali, French peacemaking and peacebuilding forces have been engaged on several fronts. Additionally, the French have been involved to some extent in the ongoing conflict in DRC. CAR, DRC, Cameroon, and Rwanda (among others) are all former French colonies. With the ongoing and recent conflicts in these countries, the question regarding the extent to which former colonizers are obligated to intervene becomes important. A related question is, if former colonizers were not obligated (legally, morally, or otherwise) to intervene in these conflicts, who would send troops for such an intervention? Is there an empirical reason why former colonizers are sent to quell conflict in former colonies, or is this a misguided moral obligation? These are questions that should be considered with regard to whether or not these interventions are wholly or in part successful.

While scholars have been addressing the above questions in some fashion or form for several years, this recent episode in the CAR brings to light the urgency with which we should be seeking the answers. At the moment, the central leadership of most of the countries in Central Africa is either deposed, compromised, or under pressure to reform their country's government. Stability is rare and often appears far out of reach. How, then, can regional politics and peacekeeping (supported, perhaps, by former colonial relationships), quell the ongoing and episodic conflicts that are occurring in Central Africa? The answer may provide insight into the utility of organizational theory as it applies to internal conflict management and resolution.



allAfrica.com: Central African Republic: After Rebels Overthrow President, UN Condemns Central African Republic Fighting