Rebels Propose Elections, Power-Sharing Government in CAR

Source: www.guardian.co.uk

A new development in the situation in CAR: The leaders of Seleka, the rebel coalition that has taken over the central government, have claimed that they intend to hold elections in the next three years. According to an AP article published March 25 2013, "rebel coalition chief Michel Djotodia on Monday said he would name a power-sharing government in an effort to defuse international condemnation of the coup" (AllAfrica.com). It is not yet known which parties (government, non-state, rebel group) will be given a seat in this power-sharing government. It would seem as though Seleka is attempting to usurp traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, as well as other transitional justice mechanisms often associated with violent political transition. Keep on eye on this story for the reaction of the international community, including state governments and international organizations.

Insurgency in the Central African Republic: New Questions and Familiar Cases

On March 24th, 2013, rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) orchestrated a successful coup to overthrow  President Francois Bozize. The rebels now control the capital, Bangui, and President Bozize is rumored to have fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December of 2012, these same rebel groups attempted a coup that eventually ended in a peace deal in January of 2013. The situation in CAR is of concern to those who study the behavior of rebel groups and rebel politics of Central African countries for several reasons:

1) The coalition of rebel groups in CAR has an identity of its own known as Seleka. Unlike rebel groups in Eastern DRC, for instance, the coalition that exists in CAR is highly centralized and effective. It is unclear from available reports the extent to which the individual armed groups that comprise Seleka maintain their own identities. However, we can assume that, at some point, these groups calculated that the costs of coordinating were less than those associated with pursuing individual missions for territorial control. Even the Mai-Mai of DRC are of a different typology than Seleka. The Mai-Mai possess several chapters throughout Eastern DRC, but they do not necessarily share the same political goals, nor are they centralized. 

Source: http://monitor.icef.com

2) The geopolitical location of the CAR is strategic in several ways. The CAR border South Sudan, DRC, Sudan, and Chad. Each of these countries is dealing with some sort of internal and transnational non-state violent group. What occurs in the CAR may promote conflict resolution in the area, or it may exacerbate the already volatile situation in the above-mentioned countries. In addition, a ripple effect (either positive or negative) may occur in those countries that are in close proximity, but not necessarily bordering CAR. 

3) CAR is a former French colony. Recently, with the Al Qaeda-inspired violence in Mali, French peacemaking and peacebuilding forces have been engaged on several fronts. Additionally, the French have been involved to some extent in the ongoing conflict in DRC. CAR, DRC, Cameroon, and Rwanda (among others) are all former French colonies. With the ongoing and recent conflicts in these countries, the question regarding the extent to which former colonizers are obligated to intervene becomes important. A related question is, if former colonizers were not obligated (legally, morally, or otherwise) to intervene in these conflicts, who would send troops for such an intervention? Is there an empirical reason why former colonizers are sent to quell conflict in former colonies, or is this a misguided moral obligation? These are questions that should be considered with regard to whether or not these interventions are wholly or in part successful.

While scholars have been addressing the above questions in some fashion or form for several years, this recent episode in the CAR brings to light the urgency with which we should be seeking the answers. At the moment, the central leadership of most of the countries in Central Africa is either deposed, compromised, or under pressure to reform their country's government. Stability is rare and often appears far out of reach. How, then, can regional politics and peacekeeping (supported, perhaps, by former colonial relationships), quell the ongoing and episodic conflicts that are occurring in Central Africa? The answer may provide insight into the utility of organizational theory as it applies to internal conflict management and resolution.


allAfrica.com: Central African Republic: After Rebels Overthrow President, UN Condemns Central African Republic Fighting

Reparations in the Midst of Violence: Impractical Solution or Opportunity for Peace?

Recent goings-on in Ituri (Democratic Republic of Congo) have brought to light an issue at the forefront of the study of transitional justice. Reparation, or the compensation of victims of human rights abuses, war crimes, and mass atrocities, is a key component of the process by which a community or state deals with the past in order to pave the way for a peaceful future. Reparations are not meant to erase the past, nor are they meant to assuage victims and their families in the name of "moving on." But reparations must be addressed and disseminated in a timely and appropriate manner by the responsible parties to the entitled victims. The process by which reparations are awarded is lengthy and arduous. It can also be dangerous given that both victims and perpetrators are often brought to the witness stand to get at the truth of what has happened and the extent to which victims are entitled reparations and perpetrators are guilty.

Read the short report by the ICTJ on reparations for crimes committed by Congolese state military members:
International Center for Transitional Justice: Reparations in the DRC

In the DRC, particularly in the North Kivu provence, trials of rebel leaders, state military officers, and other perpetrators are ongoing, even as the conflict in the region rages on. One might wonder whether it is practical and cost-effective to hold trials and truth commissions in the midst of a conflict that is ongoing. I argue that, while the logistics of holding such trials and, as is mentioned in the article, the feasibility of enforcing the outcomes of trials, are difficult to achieve, the visible presence of justice in an area struggling to reach peaceful settlements is paramount to the overall transition period between conflict and peace. The importance of enforcing the reparations policies in the DRC is not only material (and the material aspect cannot be over-emphasized), but also immaterial. Follow-through on the part of the national government to recognize victims and secure for them the care and dignity to which they are entitled, sends a strong message to the entire country that the government acts in pursuit of justice, rather than pursuit of supporting the "winning side," regardless of whether or not that "winning side" belongs to rebels, warlords, and/or rogue members of the Congolese state military. Reparations then become symbolic as well as material, practical for the recovery of victims, as well as ideologically important for those communities that remain the last bastions of non- or anti-rebel territory. In this particular case, they also send a strong message to Congolese citizens that the Congolese national military is not immune to the law and will be held accountable for the crimes its members commit.

Who Is in Charge, Here? M23 and its response to UN sanctions

M23 Congo Rebels Fear War Over UN Sanctions This is a link to an article published in the The Independent and written by Haggai Matsiko (2013) that touches on a topic that I have been grappling with for the past several months: How should the international community (and by this, I mean IGOs, NGOs, international non-state actors in general, and state governments) treat rebel groups in the context of forging peace agreements? There are obvious dangers to raising these groups to a state-like status, but there are also drawbacks to failing to provide enough legitimacy to make negotiations meaningful for the rebel parties.

The UN has imposed sanctions and travel bans on high-ranking members of M23, spurring resentment and renewed tensions between the rebel group and the government of the DRC. The sanctions were imposed following investigations into accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the responsibility of the UN to intervene in situations where civilians are being targeted, harmed, and killed, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a state or non-state actor. But the government of the DRC warns that such actions by the UN will only inflame the situation, bringing about more destruction and loss of life. It appears as though M23 has enough control over the fragile situation in Eastern DRC to hold state governments at bay . . . but what of the international community? To what extent is the UN willing to provide support to DRC civilians in light of the sanctions the UN has imposed on M23? We must not be satisfied with precedent and status quo, but we, especially scholars of transitional justice, but continually ask ourselves questions regarding responsibility, power, control, and enforcement. These negotiations with M23 will not end quickly. Let us see whether this group remains resolute about an independent territory in North Kivu.

DRC, M23 Adopt Agenda of Peace Talks

The latest attempt to foster peace in Eastern DRC . . . This time, instead of drafting an entirely new document, the parties involved have revised and recommitted to tenets of past peace agreements. One aspect of this newest development that I find interesting is the new focus on citizenship and its role in the conflict. It is common knowledge for individuals in this area of Africa that citizenship as a Congolese is both poorly documented and highly politicized. Apparently, this issue has been addressed in the latest talks:

"According to a statement issued yesterday, the talks will tackle the effective implementation of the law on citizenship and its application on the ground in view of the fight against discrimination" (Muramira 2013).


Another area of interest in these talks is the inclusion of a discussion regarding the release of political and war prisoners. It will be interesting to see what level (or levels) of judicial decision-making and enforcement will be employed to this end. In the past, amnesty was the largest bargaining chip in Eastern DRC peace agreements. Could there be continued bargaining, not just between the national government and rebel leaders, but among local officials, foreign national governments, and third-party organizations?


Muramira, Gashegu. (2013). "DRC, M23 Adopt Agenda of Peace Talks." allAfrica.com, 17 January 2013. 
allAfrica.com: Congo-Kinshasa: DRC, M23 Adopt Agenda of Peace Talks

Congo’s M23 conflict: Rebellion or resource war? (Op-Ed)

When I discuss my work, I often use the term "rebel group" to identify the many non-state groups involved in the conflict in Eastern DRC. This label is sometimes criticized as a misnomer by those who argue that the conflict in Eastern DRC is a war about control over resources rather than an attempt to overthrow, change, or replace the national government. I argue that, for sustained conflicts, such as the one in Eastern DRC, it is difficult to parse out exactly what the goals of each actor are with regards to interests in the conflict. Is Eastern DRC, including both conflict and transitional justice components, primarily an economic story (opportunity)? Is it primarily a grievance story? Or could it be a combination of the two?

In an article by Nile Bowie (RT.com, January 14th, 2013) (Rebellion or resource war?), this question of rebel motives is discussed. At the end of the article, the author brings up an important factor that contributes to the conflict process in Eastern DRC:

"If Kabila wants to stay in power, he needs the capability of exercising authority over the entire country. Sanctions should be imposed on top-level Rwandan and Ugandan officials and all military aid should be withheld; additionally, Rwandan strongman Paul Kagame should be investigated and removed from his position."

The factor alluded to in this paragraph is that of geographical proximity. The area of DRC is 2,345,000 km² (905,600 sq miles). Kinshasa (the capital of DRC) is on the opposite side of the country from North Kivu province. Rwanda and Uganda are closer in proximity to this area than the DRC's national government. Elsewhere in the article, it is suggested that by diminishing the size of rebel groups (of which there are around 40 in the DRC), the national government may be able to gain more control over the Eastern provinces. How could this be accomplished? Given their close proximity to the area most affected by conflict, how involved (and in what ways) should Rwanda and Uganda play a role in this situation? Consider, also, the enormity of the IDP (internally displaced persons) and refugee situations that are resulting from this conflict. Consider the geo-political consequences of state, IGO, and NGO decision-making.