Funding Update: Seeing the "Big Picture"

At an orphanage near Uromi, Nigeria in the summer of 2006.
Never forget what is most important about the work you do.
For me, the most important aspect of this project is
safeguarding the futures of the individuals who survive violent
conflict in whatever way(s) I am able. In the words of my father,
 "At the end of the day, no matter what happens, no matter what you've
lost or won, it's people that matter."

Every now and then, when you're up to your eyeballs in research and you're having difficulty finding the light at the end of the tunnel . . . you have a breakthrough. Today was one of those days. Thanks to the unwavering enthusiasm of my mentor/advisor, as well as that of my family and close friends, I have managed to draft an outline of the ways in which the research I have done, both at Indiana University and the University of New Mexico, up to this point fits into a broader project pursuant to the goal of making the world a safer and more promising place in the wake of violent conflict. It is my hope that I can use this trip this summer to set in motion a research program that addresses concerns related to mental health, children, single parent families, domestic abuse, and indigenous solutions . . . all within the context of ending politically-motivated violent conflict and establishing a workable, sustainable peace.

Some might ask whether the goal should be preventing conflict from occurring in the first place. I argue that by focusing on improving reconstructive and transitional justice mechanisms and institutions, peace will become more durable and more readily disseminated in areas that are at-risk for violent conflict. (Extant research shows that there are risk-factors related to internal conflict and civil war, making these events predictable to some extent). But by ignoring what can be done in the post-conflict period in order to focus on preventing the outbreak of violent conflict in areas identified as high-risk, we are missing an opportunity for conflict/peace research and meaningful policy recommendations that could contribute to quelling poverty, hunger, domestic violence, etc., and improving economies, health outcomes, and the futures of hundreds of thousands of individuals. 

I also have three working papers that I expect to complete by the second week in May. The first considers how combatants and ex-combatants are represented in post-conflict democratic elections vis-a-vis the development of electoral rules. The second applies a theory of organization and co-optation to the development and implementation of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs. The third is a research note regarding the recent national election in Kenya. Now that I have a formal and central thread throughout all of my work, I feel even more confident that the project this summer, as well as the subsequent research that is sure to follow, is imperative for the development of policies that aim to assist former combatants of all types in the aftermath of conflict.

Thank you, again, to all who have contributed and shown their support. Every little bit helps!

~Jennifer

Inspired by all of the support I have received,
I spent my Saturday morning writing (by hand)
over fourteen pages of my project.
Thank you for the added drive!

Insurgency in the Central African Republic: New Questions and Familiar Cases

On March 24th, 2013, rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) orchestrated a successful coup to overthrow  President Francois Bozize. The rebels now control the capital, Bangui, and President Bozize is rumored to have fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December of 2012, these same rebel groups attempted a coup that eventually ended in a peace deal in January of 2013. The situation in CAR is of concern to those who study the behavior of rebel groups and rebel politics of Central African countries for several reasons:

1) The coalition of rebel groups in CAR has an identity of its own known as Seleka. Unlike rebel groups in Eastern DRC, for instance, the coalition that exists in CAR is highly centralized and effective. It is unclear from available reports the extent to which the individual armed groups that comprise Seleka maintain their own identities. However, we can assume that, at some point, these groups calculated that the costs of coordinating were less than those associated with pursuing individual missions for territorial control. Even the Mai-Mai of DRC are of a different typology than Seleka. The Mai-Mai possess several chapters throughout Eastern DRC, but they do not necessarily share the same political goals, nor are they centralized. 

Source: http://monitor.icef.com

2) The geopolitical location of the CAR is strategic in several ways. The CAR border South Sudan, DRC, Sudan, and Chad. Each of these countries is dealing with some sort of internal and transnational non-state violent group. What occurs in the CAR may promote conflict resolution in the area, or it may exacerbate the already volatile situation in the above-mentioned countries. In addition, a ripple effect (either positive or negative) may occur in those countries that are in close proximity, but not necessarily bordering CAR. 

3) CAR is a former French colony. Recently, with the Al Qaeda-inspired violence in Mali, French peacemaking and peacebuilding forces have been engaged on several fronts. Additionally, the French have been involved to some extent in the ongoing conflict in DRC. CAR, DRC, Cameroon, and Rwanda (among others) are all former French colonies. With the ongoing and recent conflicts in these countries, the question regarding the extent to which former colonizers are obligated to intervene becomes important. A related question is, if former colonizers were not obligated (legally, morally, or otherwise) to intervene in these conflicts, who would send troops for such an intervention? Is there an empirical reason why former colonizers are sent to quell conflict in former colonies, or is this a misguided moral obligation? These are questions that should be considered with regard to whether or not these interventions are wholly or in part successful.

While scholars have been addressing the above questions in some fashion or form for several years, this recent episode in the CAR brings to light the urgency with which we should be seeking the answers. At the moment, the central leadership of most of the countries in Central Africa is either deposed, compromised, or under pressure to reform their country's government. Stability is rare and often appears far out of reach. How, then, can regional politics and peacekeeping (supported, perhaps, by former colonial relationships), quell the ongoing and episodic conflicts that are occurring in Central Africa? The answer may provide insight into the utility of organizational theory as it applies to internal conflict management and resolution.


allAfrica.com: Central African Republic: After Rebels Overthrow President, UN Condemns Central African Republic Fighting