Research Project Update: Atlas.ti Software!

In case you have not checked out my funding site, I wanted to share an update regarding the progress I have made on my field paper/dissertation project. Thanks to generous donations, I was able to purchase, download, and start working with Atlas.ti.v7 qualitative software. Below is the update posted on my funding site:

Thanks to the generous donations I've received so far, I was able to purchase and download Atlas.ti.v7 qualitative analysis software! For a "qualie" (term of endearment for someone who specializes in the use of qualitative empirical research methods), the Atlas.ti software is a dream come true. It was not long ago that researchers interested in mix-methods or grounded theory (see Kathy Charmaz (2006) for an overview of grounded theory) had to do all of this data entry and coding by hand. My first qualitative project, a narrative analysis of intimate partner violence survivors, was all by hand and I only used seven interviews. I cannot imagine what a monster this project would be if it were not for the comprehensive and easy-to-use Atlas.ti software. Of course, Atlas.ti is not the only qualitative analysis software on the market. There are certainly die-hard InVivo and NUD*IST users out there. I've tried all three software choices and find that, for a mixed-methods researcher, Atlas.ti is the most user-friendly. One of the aspects of this software that I am thrilled about with regards to my upcoming fieldwork is the ability to effortlessly upload survey responses into the program and code for themes among the quantitative, as well as qualitative data. The program allows me to combine all of my data sources into one aggregate analysis, if I so choose. What usually happens is that researchers present a qualitative and quantitative analysis together, but separately, in a paper. With Atlas.ti, I have the ability to combine them to produce what (I hope) will be a much more meaningful and in-depth understanding of why and how ex-combatants choose to defect from reintegration programs in the post-conflict period.

Thank you again to everyone who has supported me on this journey! I will continue to post updates and share exciting milestones along the way!

Cheers,

Jennifer

Rebels Propose Elections, Power-Sharing Government in CAR

Source: www.guardian.co.uk

A new development in the situation in CAR: The leaders of Seleka, the rebel coalition that has taken over the central government, have claimed that they intend to hold elections in the next three years. According to an AP article published March 25 2013, "rebel coalition chief Michel Djotodia on Monday said he would name a power-sharing government in an effort to defuse international condemnation of the coup" (AllAfrica.com). It is not yet known which parties (government, non-state, rebel group) will be given a seat in this power-sharing government. It would seem as though Seleka is attempting to usurp traditional peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts, as well as other transitional justice mechanisms often associated with violent political transition. Keep on eye on this story for the reaction of the international community, including state governments and international organizations.

Insurgency in the Central African Republic: New Questions and Familiar Cases

On March 24th, 2013, rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) orchestrated a successful coup to overthrow  President Francois Bozize. The rebels now control the capital, Bangui, and President Bozize is rumored to have fled into the Democratic Republic of Congo. In December of 2012, these same rebel groups attempted a coup that eventually ended in a peace deal in January of 2013. The situation in CAR is of concern to those who study the behavior of rebel groups and rebel politics of Central African countries for several reasons:

1) The coalition of rebel groups in CAR has an identity of its own known as Seleka. Unlike rebel groups in Eastern DRC, for instance, the coalition that exists in CAR is highly centralized and effective. It is unclear from available reports the extent to which the individual armed groups that comprise Seleka maintain their own identities. However, we can assume that, at some point, these groups calculated that the costs of coordinating were less than those associated with pursuing individual missions for territorial control. Even the Mai-Mai of DRC are of a different typology than Seleka. The Mai-Mai possess several chapters throughout Eastern DRC, but they do not necessarily share the same political goals, nor are they centralized. 

Source: http://monitor.icef.com

2) The geopolitical location of the CAR is strategic in several ways. The CAR border South Sudan, DRC, Sudan, and Chad. Each of these countries is dealing with some sort of internal and transnational non-state violent group. What occurs in the CAR may promote conflict resolution in the area, or it may exacerbate the already volatile situation in the above-mentioned countries. In addition, a ripple effect (either positive or negative) may occur in those countries that are in close proximity, but not necessarily bordering CAR. 

3) CAR is a former French colony. Recently, with the Al Qaeda-inspired violence in Mali, French peacemaking and peacebuilding forces have been engaged on several fronts. Additionally, the French have been involved to some extent in the ongoing conflict in DRC. CAR, DRC, Cameroon, and Rwanda (among others) are all former French colonies. With the ongoing and recent conflicts in these countries, the question regarding the extent to which former colonizers are obligated to intervene becomes important. A related question is, if former colonizers were not obligated (legally, morally, or otherwise) to intervene in these conflicts, who would send troops for such an intervention? Is there an empirical reason why former colonizers are sent to quell conflict in former colonies, or is this a misguided moral obligation? These are questions that should be considered with regard to whether or not these interventions are wholly or in part successful.

While scholars have been addressing the above questions in some fashion or form for several years, this recent episode in the CAR brings to light the urgency with which we should be seeking the answers. At the moment, the central leadership of most of the countries in Central Africa is either deposed, compromised, or under pressure to reform their country's government. Stability is rare and often appears far out of reach. How, then, can regional politics and peacekeeping (supported, perhaps, by former colonial relationships), quell the ongoing and episodic conflicts that are occurring in Central Africa? The answer may provide insight into the utility of organizational theory as it applies to internal conflict management and resolution.


allAfrica.com: Central African Republic: After Rebels Overthrow President, UN Condemns Central African Republic Fighting