Preparing for Fieldwork in Central Africa

We are still waiting for news out of Kenya regarding the next President, but several sources are reporting that Kenyatta is showing a sustained and early lead against Odinga (Check in with AllAfrica.com for updates from several local news sources). As soon as we know something decisive,  I'll post a summary and reaction on this blog.

For now, I would like to share an opportunity for you to support the work that is being done to alleviate conflict and sustain peace in Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, South Sudan, and other areas where armed groups are engaged in politically-motivated and sustained violent activity.

I am finally at the stage in my current research endeavor where I can begin to collect data in the field. This summer, I will be traveling to Uganda to talk with individuals who are in some way involved in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process in the Great Lakes Region. I had originally hoped to travel to Eastern DRC, but I have been selected to attend the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research in Syracuse for two weeks in the middle of the summer. This alters my time-frame such that a trip to DRC needs to wait until I can dedicate several uninterrupted months to this endeavor. A trip to Uganda will allow me to 1) establish a network of contacts on the ground in the area (and re-connect with previous contacts), 2) find out more about the DDR situation in both Western Uganda and Eastern DRC, and 3) begin to develop an original dataset that will be used to answer questions regarding ex-combatants and the reintegration process during times of conflict as well as peace. All of this work will better prepare me to conduct fieldwork in Eastern DRC at a future date.

I encourage you to visit my fundraising site to read an abstract of the project proposal, as well as other details regarding my trip. If you feel compelled to support this project, you may make a monetary donation of your choosing on the site. I will be sure to keep all donors up-to-date regarding the progress of the project. I will also include the names of donors (unless you wish to remain anonymous) in the acknowledgements section of any publication that is produced as a result of this project. I thank you in advance for any support you are willing to give. As always, feel free to contact me regarding any questions, comments, or critiques.

Reparations in the Midst of Violence: Impractical Solution or Opportunity for Peace?

Recent goings-on in Ituri (Democratic Republic of Congo) have brought to light an issue at the forefront of the study of transitional justice. Reparation, or the compensation of victims of human rights abuses, war crimes, and mass atrocities, is a key component of the process by which a community or state deals with the past in order to pave the way for a peaceful future. Reparations are not meant to erase the past, nor are they meant to assuage victims and their families in the name of "moving on." But reparations must be addressed and disseminated in a timely and appropriate manner by the responsible parties to the entitled victims. The process by which reparations are awarded is lengthy and arduous. It can also be dangerous given that both victims and perpetrators are often brought to the witness stand to get at the truth of what has happened and the extent to which victims are entitled reparations and perpetrators are guilty.

Read the short report by the ICTJ on reparations for crimes committed by Congolese state military members:
International Center for Transitional Justice: Reparations in the DRC

In the DRC, particularly in the North Kivu provence, trials of rebel leaders, state military officers, and other perpetrators are ongoing, even as the conflict in the region rages on. One might wonder whether it is practical and cost-effective to hold trials and truth commissions in the midst of a conflict that is ongoing. I argue that, while the logistics of holding such trials and, as is mentioned in the article, the feasibility of enforcing the outcomes of trials, are difficult to achieve, the visible presence of justice in an area struggling to reach peaceful settlements is paramount to the overall transition period between conflict and peace. The importance of enforcing the reparations policies in the DRC is not only material (and the material aspect cannot be over-emphasized), but also immaterial. Follow-through on the part of the national government to recognize victims and secure for them the care and dignity to which they are entitled, sends a strong message to the entire country that the government acts in pursuit of justice, rather than pursuit of supporting the "winning side," regardless of whether or not that "winning side" belongs to rebels, warlords, and/or rogue members of the Congolese state military. Reparations then become symbolic as well as material, practical for the recovery of victims, as well as ideologically important for those communities that remain the last bastions of non- or anti-rebel territory. In this particular case, they also send a strong message to Congolese citizens that the Congolese national military is not immune to the law and will be held accountable for the crimes its members commit.

Cessation of Child Recruitment: A public health approach to a political and social problem

My experience as a public health professional has provided perspective and insight into my career as a political scientist in several ways. One way in which my cross-disciplinary training has been useful is in regard to the study of child soldiering. Specifically, my research is interested in the ways in which child soldiering (that is, the forced and/or coerced recruitment of children under the age of 16) can be prevented. Many public health and political projects that deal with the issue of child soldiering examine the causes and outcomes of the practice, but they do not explore the possibility of prevention. I argue that prevention of child soldiering is not only possible, but is a key component in the cessation of mass atrocity and crimes against humanity within the context of irregular warfare. The following is a very brief outline of this argument, including the theoretical groundings upon which the argument is based.

Preventing Prevalence of PTSD Among Children in Conflict Settings:

A Social Cognitive Theory Approach to Targeting Armed Forces as a Means to

Ceasing Forced Recruitment of Children in the Great Lakes Region

Health Issue, Behavior and Priority Group

The prevalence of malignant forms of PTSD in former child soldiers on the African continent threatens to hamper efforts for post-conflict community reconstruction.  The only way to effectively decrease the number of children diagnosed with malignant PTSD is to cease the forced recruitment of children from within refugee camps, particularly in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  The priority group for intervention implementation is composed of those individuals who are forcefully recruiting children into the armed forces within the Great Lakes Region refugee camps.

Summary of the Literature on Determinants of Forced Recruitment by Armed Forces

According to several studies, the way in which recruiting soldiers view their own environment and situation, in addition to that of the children they are charged with recruiting, may influence their behavior.  Four studies cited external factors in the recruiters’ environments, such as their military comrades and political affiliation as constructs directly affecting their recruiting behavior, (Maxted, 2003; Andvig and Gates, 2006; Singer, 2006; Lischer, 2006).  In addition, four studies also mentioned the situation, or perceived social status within ranks and perceived importance to their community, may be able to be influenced in such a way that soldiers no longer feel the pressure from environmental factors to recruit children, (Maxted, 2003; Aning and McIntyre, 2005; Singer, 2006; Beber and Blattman, 2008).  Soldiers are often told that the only way to bring order to their people is to control those who presumably do not have the capacity to thrive independently, (Aning and McIntyre, 2005).  Soldiers are conditioned to believe that if they recruit children who would otherwise be a menace to society, their country will benefit.  This conditioning builds outcome expectations among recruiting soldiers as to what will happen if they choose to recruit children into the armed forces, (Aning and McIntyre, 2005; Blattman, 2007).  Governments equate the benefit of the country as a whole with the benefit of those who assisted in its protection and support, thereby creating positive outcome expectancies for those who choose to forcefully recruit children into the armed forces, (Aning and McIntyre, 2005). 

Rationale for Social Cognitive Theory and Analysis of Determinants

            The most pervasive constructs in discussion regarding change in recruitment behavior come from the Social Cognitive Theory.  Due to the interpersonal nature of military culture, as well as the profound impact of state activities on the activities of the military, the Social Cognitive Theory is the best model by which to formulate an intervention program targeting soldiers who recruit children for service.  Utilizing the Principle of Reciprocal Determinism, it is hypothesized that by affecting environmental influences, such as implementing and enforcing the international laws and rules of warfare in areas where formal conflict exists, and by altering soldiers’ situation and outcome expectations (thereby affecting their outcome expectancies), military units will cease forceful recruit of children from refugee camps in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.  One recommendation for further research would be to understand the role that self-efficacy plays in individual soldiers’ intention to cease recruitment children from refugee camps.  As self-efficacy is the single most important construct of the Social Cognitive Theory, it is imperative that program developers understand how best to improve soldiers’ confidence in choosing not to recruit children.  Lack of volitional control, however, will continue to be the greatest barrier in tackling cessation of child recruitment.  

Copyright 2013 Jennifer M Kerner, M.P.H.

Please contact the author before reproducing this publication in whole or in part: jmkerner@unm.edu

Andvig, J.C. and Gates, S.  (2006).  “Recruiting Children for Armed Conflict.”  Keynote address at the Dutch Flemish Association for Economy and Peace.

Aning, K. and McIntyre, A.  (2005).  “From Youth Rebellion to Child Abduction: The Anatomy of Recruitment in Sierre Leone.”  In Invisible Stakeholders: Children and War in Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

*Beber, B. and Blattman, C.  (2008).  “Rebels without a Cause: The Use of Coercion and Children in Guerrilla Warfare.”  Lecture printed by Columbia University Press.

*Blattman, C.  (2007).  “The Causes of Child Soldiering: Theory and Evidence from Northern Uganda.”  Lecture printed by University of California Press.

*Lischer, S.K.  (2006).  “War, Displacement, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers.”  Lecture printed by Wake Forest University Press.

Maxted, J.  (2003).  “Children and Armed Conflict in Africa.”  Social Identities, 9(1):51-72.

Singer, P.W.  (2006).  “The Enablers of War: Casual Factors behind the Child Soldier Phenomenon.”  The Brookings Institute.

*Transcripts of lectures were provided following personal request.  Copies of these papers are immediately available upon request.

Who Is in Charge, Here? M23 and its response to UN sanctions

M23 Congo Rebels Fear War Over UN Sanctions This is a link to an article published in the The Independent and written by Haggai Matsiko (2013) that touches on a topic that I have been grappling with for the past several months: How should the international community (and by this, I mean IGOs, NGOs, international non-state actors in general, and state governments) treat rebel groups in the context of forging peace agreements? There are obvious dangers to raising these groups to a state-like status, but there are also drawbacks to failing to provide enough legitimacy to make negotiations meaningful for the rebel parties.

The UN has imposed sanctions and travel bans on high-ranking members of M23, spurring resentment and renewed tensions between the rebel group and the government of the DRC. The sanctions were imposed following investigations into accusations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is the responsibility of the UN to intervene in situations where civilians are being targeted, harmed, and killed, regardless of whether the perpetrator is a state or non-state actor. But the government of the DRC warns that such actions by the UN will only inflame the situation, bringing about more destruction and loss of life. It appears as though M23 has enough control over the fragile situation in Eastern DRC to hold state governments at bay . . . but what of the international community? To what extent is the UN willing to provide support to DRC civilians in light of the sanctions the UN has imposed on M23? We must not be satisfied with precedent and status quo, but we, especially scholars of transitional justice, but continually ask ourselves questions regarding responsibility, power, control, and enforcement. These negotiations with M23 will not end quickly. Let us see whether this group remains resolute about an independent territory in North Kivu.

DRC, M23 Adopt Agenda of Peace Talks

The latest attempt to foster peace in Eastern DRC . . . This time, instead of drafting an entirely new document, the parties involved have revised and recommitted to tenets of past peace agreements. One aspect of this newest development that I find interesting is the new focus on citizenship and its role in the conflict. It is common knowledge for individuals in this area of Africa that citizenship as a Congolese is both poorly documented and highly politicized. Apparently, this issue has been addressed in the latest talks:

"According to a statement issued yesterday, the talks will tackle the effective implementation of the law on citizenship and its application on the ground in view of the fight against discrimination" (Muramira 2013).


Another area of interest in these talks is the inclusion of a discussion regarding the release of political and war prisoners. It will be interesting to see what level (or levels) of judicial decision-making and enforcement will be employed to this end. In the past, amnesty was the largest bargaining chip in Eastern DRC peace agreements. Could there be continued bargaining, not just between the national government and rebel leaders, but among local officials, foreign national governments, and third-party organizations?


Muramira, Gashegu. (2013). "DRC, M23 Adopt Agenda of Peace Talks." allAfrica.com, 17 January 2013. 
allAfrica.com: Congo-Kinshasa: DRC, M23 Adopt Agenda of Peace Talks

Congo’s M23 conflict: Rebellion or resource war? (Op-Ed)

When I discuss my work, I often use the term "rebel group" to identify the many non-state groups involved in the conflict in Eastern DRC. This label is sometimes criticized as a misnomer by those who argue that the conflict in Eastern DRC is a war about control over resources rather than an attempt to overthrow, change, or replace the national government. I argue that, for sustained conflicts, such as the one in Eastern DRC, it is difficult to parse out exactly what the goals of each actor are with regards to interests in the conflict. Is Eastern DRC, including both conflict and transitional justice components, primarily an economic story (opportunity)? Is it primarily a grievance story? Or could it be a combination of the two?

In an article by Nile Bowie (RT.com, January 14th, 2013) (Rebellion or resource war?), this question of rebel motives is discussed. At the end of the article, the author brings up an important factor that contributes to the conflict process in Eastern DRC:

"If Kabila wants to stay in power, he needs the capability of exercising authority over the entire country. Sanctions should be imposed on top-level Rwandan and Ugandan officials and all military aid should be withheld; additionally, Rwandan strongman Paul Kagame should be investigated and removed from his position."

The factor alluded to in this paragraph is that of geographical proximity. The area of DRC is 2,345,000 km² (905,600 sq miles). Kinshasa (the capital of DRC) is on the opposite side of the country from North Kivu province. Rwanda and Uganda are closer in proximity to this area than the DRC's national government. Elsewhere in the article, it is suggested that by diminishing the size of rebel groups (of which there are around 40 in the DRC), the national government may be able to gain more control over the Eastern provinces. How could this be accomplished? Given their close proximity to the area most affected by conflict, how involved (and in what ways) should Rwanda and Uganda play a role in this situation? Consider, also, the enormity of the IDP (internally displaced persons) and refugee situations that are resulting from this conflict. Consider the geo-political consequences of state, IGO, and NGO decision-making.